Introduction 1
The notion of "governance without government" depicted an emerging trend in international cooperation, in which states were no longer solely responsible for the management of global policy challenges (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992) . Tallberg and Jönsson (this volume) describe a similar "transnational turn in global governance" involving an increasingly complex web of actors and institutions in world politics. This chapter aims to describe this transnational turn, by examining 100 years of delegation to transnational actors (TNAs) in environmental politics.
Many recent studies begin from the assumption that the role of TNAs in world politics is growing; indeed, the first major question posed by this volume is "why have international institutions increasingly opened up to transnational actor involvement?" I begin my inquiry one step earlier, first showing through a careful historical analysis that states are, in fact, increasingly delegating policy functions to TNAs. I look closely at one governance role assumed by TNAs: the extent to which they are selected as agents by states. This study thus contributes to the study of TNAs -and, therefore, debates on private authority and the role of the state -by understanding when and how they are selected to act on behalf of states.
I focus exclusively on formal mechanisms for collaboration, as described by Tallberg and Jönsson. I refer to situations in which states choose to delegate to private actors as delegated private authority, or more simply, private authority. I define transnational actors as y y private actors that organize and operate across state borders, and use the two terms interchangeably. Other authors in this volume, such as Liese and Kalm, examine informal mechanisms for TNA participation. Certainly, both types of participation are needed to provide a complete map of the variation of TNA participation in global governance. However, I limit my own investigation to formal delegated private authority, with the hope that it will provide a sound foundation from which to explore other less institutionalized forms of TNA participation.
The chapter has three main goals. The primary goal is to provide longitudinal data to contextualize other studies of private authority. Thus, the chapter asks two basic questions: how often do states delegate to TNAs, and for what tasks? Although there is a sizeable body of literature on the impact of global civil society in environmental politics (see, e.g., Betsill and Corell, 2008; Fisher, 1997; Green and Chambers, 2006; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Lipschutz, 1992; Wapner, 1996) and the existence of private authority (Cutler et al., 1999; Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Haufler, 2001) , few of these works attempt to measure the breadth of private authority. In other words, many suffer from selection bias, focusing only on cases where private authority exists. The major contribution of this chapter is to provide a large-N analysis to contextualize other work.
Second, by analyzing patterns of delegation at both the level of the treaty and the "sub-treaty" level -legal decisions taken by parties once the treaty has been signed -I provide additional data on whether and how delegation patterns differ by legal instrument. The literature on NGOs often asserts that international organizations "subcontract" out work to NGOs (Donini, 1996; Edwards and Hulme, 1996) . My dataset provides additional evidence that this is in fact the case, and that there are several common delegated activities that occur at the sub-treaty level.
Third and finally, by conceptualizing delegation to TNAs as a type of private authority, I aim to bridge the gap between the delegation and private authority literatures. These two literatures have been treated separately, yet delegation can and should be considered a type of authority. When states delegate to private actors, they grant agents authority to act on their behalf. Part of the reason that much of the scholarship on private authority suffers from selection bias is because of the difficulty of defining the universe of cases. The advantage of including delegation to TNAs as a type of private authority is that it lends itself more easily to delineating a universe of cases -the set of decisions that states take collectively in intergovernmental agreements.
